Introduction
Within a very short period of time, from 2002 to 2007, China's CO 2 emissions have almost doubled and it is now believed that China is the world's biggest emitter of CO 2 (MNP, 2007) . China faces increasing international pressure to curb its CO 2 emissions, but argues that " [t] he ramifications of limiting the development of developing countries would be even more serious than those from climate change." (Wu, 2007) . China has several arguments for why it should not be required to limit its CO 2 emissions in the short term (National Development and Reform Commission, 2007) . First, limits on China's CO 2 emissions would hamper economic development. Second, China has low per capita emissions, ranked 72 nd in 2004, although this ranking is both higher than most developed countries and growing quickly (WRI, 2007) . Third, historically China argues that it only contributes a small amount to cumulative emissions, ranking 91 st in cumulative emissions since 1900 (WRI, 2007) . Finally, despite capital investments and household consumption dominating China's increasing CO 2 emissions (Peters et al., 2007) , China has currently focused arguments towards the role of exports, claiming it should not be responsible for emissions attributable to the production of exports (McGregor, 2007) . In 2005 exports accounted for a relatively large amount: 33% of China's GDP, increasing from 12% in 1987.
Despite several references to this issue (Ahmad et al., 2003; Peters et al., 2008; Peters et al., 2007; Wang et al., 2007) , there have been no systematic studies on the contribution of exports to China's CO 2 emissions, and particularly how this has changed over time. Several studies have estimated the emissions embodied in China's exports (and imports), but few studies have focused on this as the primary issue. Ahmad and Wyckoff (Ahmad & Wyckoff, 2003 ) using a related method to ours, found that in 1997, 15% of China's emissions were embodied in exports and 3% of China's domestic emissions were imported. In the Supporting Information, Peters et al. (Peters et al., 2007) found that in 1997 25% of China's emissions were exported and 24% imported and in 2002 32% and 34%. However, Peters et al. did not adjust for imports in the production of exports, and thus their method differs slightly from what is used here.
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China's exports in 2004 as 24%, though they used a relatively simple method which fails to capture supply-chain effects. The most comprehensive study to date, Peters and Hertwich (Peters & Hertwich, 2008) considered the emissions embodied in trade for 87 countries and regions and found that in 2001 China exported 24% of its CO 2 emissions and imported 7% of China's domestic emissions. This study is the most similar methodologically to the analysis presented here and will be used to supplement the results.
We apply environmental input-output analysis (Leontief et al., 1972) to estimate the CO 2 emissions emitted in the production of exports in China from 1987 to 2005, the most recent year available in data. This method considers all the upstream supply-chain inputs necessary for the production of exports. The following section describes methods and data sources, followed by the results and a discussion of their relevance.
Methods and Data

Environmental Input-Output Analysis (EIOA)
The calculations are based on environmental input-output analysis (EIOA) with some adjustments, (Miller et al., 1985; United Nations, 1999) . A summary of the method is shown here, but more detailed treatments are available elsewhere (Miller and Blair, 1985, United Nations, 1999) . We begin with the familiar Leontief economic balance (Leontief, 1986) , where the total output of an economy, x, can be expressed as the sum of intermediate consumption, Ax, and final consumption, y:
where A is the economy's direct requirements matrix and y is the demand for which the supply chain output, x, is to be derived. The matrix A describes the relationship between all sectors of the economy. In this study we used four separate final demands, y, from each year's input-output table: household consumption, fixed capital investment, exports, and governmental consumption. When solved for total output, this equation yields:
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When coupled with an environmental matrix, F, which shows the environmental emissions caused by each sector in the model, normalized by the sector's economic output, x = (x 1 x 2 … x m ) T , the total amount of emissions can be calculated as:
with f representing the sector-wise total supply chain emissions to meet the final demand y. 
This method removes imported goods from the direct requirements table and from components of GDP other than exports, i (household consumption, capital investment, and government consumption). This method inherently assumes that the same share of imports are present in each sector's demand and in each final demand category; for example, it assumes that businesses, government, and households, who all consume software, each consume the same share of domestically produced and imported software.
For each year, then, the emissions embodied in exports (or other GDP components) are calculated as:
where f d is total domestic emissions embodied in demand y d .
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In addition to this standard method, IOA usually require some degree of countryspecific manipulations depending on data availability.
Treatment of Others
The Chinese input-output tables (IOTs) follow most standard formats except for a final demand column called "Others". This column appears in all years, except 1995. The GDP derived by summing the value added matches the GDP derived by summing final demand only if "Others" is included. The error in aggregated GDP by not including
Others is small (<1%). However, on a sector-by-sector basis Others can represent up to 8% of output or even totally dominate final demand. This suggests considerable caution is needed if using "Others" as a final demand. Since "Others" plays a dominant role in some sectors, there is no obvious treatment of it to avoid spurious results.
According to NBS (National Bureau of Statistics, 1999) the Others column primarily represents different reported data, particularly related to trade. Thus, we interpret "Others" as an estimate of an error term representing different data sources. We do not include the error in our calculation of output, thus output, x total , is given as the sum of the intermediate flows and the final demand not including "Others". This output, not the output listed in the IOTs, is used to normalize the IOTs and emissions data.
Normalization
We follow standard procedures for normalization of the IOT and the energy and emissions data,
where A is the inter-industry requirements matrix which represents the technology of the Chinese economy. Because the energy data is more aggregated than the IOTs, it is necessary to map between the IO sectors and the energy sectors for each year. To normalize the total energy and emissions data, T, we first aggregate the output to the sector classification used in the energy and emissions data and then normalize,
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where P represents the mapping between IO sectors and energy sector, constructed from the sector descriptions of the IOT and energy data. This procedure assumes that all IO sectors that map to the one energy sector have the same emission intensity. Since the IOT and energy intensities now have the same industry classification, we can perform the calculation for each year, as shown above in equation 5.
Approximation of Regional Responsibility
Since IOTs do not include information about the country of destination for exports, additional data was needed to determine the destination of China's export emissions.
This analysis was based on a previous study by one of the authors (GP) using multiregional model of international trade using the GTAP database (Peters & Hertwich, 2008) . The methodology is similar as described in this paper, except that it intensive than exports to the rest of the world, Table 1. These relative factors were then used in combination with total exports to each region (see Table 2 ) to approximate embodied CO 2 exported to each region in 2003-2005. 8 Weber, C.L., Peters, G.P., Guan, D., Hubacek, K.
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Input-Output Data
We employed China's input-output tables (IOT) from Li and Xue (Li et al., 1998 (Li et al., ) for 1987 (Li et al., , 1990 (Li et al., and 1995 expenditures, capitals investments, exports, imports, and "others" (see above).
Energy and Emissions Data
The CO 2 by industry sector for 1992, 1997, and 2002 were constructed in previous work by two of the authors (GP and CW) , and data for all other years were calculated using the same method (see (Peters et al., 2006) for details). The emissions include both the combustion of fuels and industrial processes and were constructed using official
Chinese energy statistics and the IPCC reference approach (IPCC, 1996) . The energy and emissions data have 36 industry sectors.
It should be noted that several authors have questioned the legitimacy of the official Chinese energy statistics for certain years, especially from around 1996 to 2004 (Sinton, 2001; Streets et al., 2001; Wu, 2007) . During this period, Chinese coal consumption first declined and then rose precipitously, creating substantial variation in the energy intensity of the economy. There is still significant controversy over whether the 1996-2000 decline in energy intensity was real or a factor of under-reporting to data collection agencies (Peters et al., 2007) , though recent satellite data seems to suggest some level of under-reporting (Akimoto et al., 2006) . We utilize the raw data from the Chinese statistical agencies despite these issues, though we note that this may cause an underestimation of China's export emissions in 2000 and 2002. It is useful to analyze the breakdown of Chinese export emissions by commodity. Figure 2 shows a breakdown of the growth in these emissions by major commodity group that China exports. Recently (in 2005), substantial fractions of total emissions are due to exports of electronics (22% of total), metal products (13%), textiles (11%), and chemical products (10%). It is clear that the large recent growth in export emissions is due more to advanced products than previously, as the 1995 breakdown of export emissions was substantially different: 19% textiles, 13% electronics, 12% machinery, and 10% chemicals, and 7% metal products. Emissions embodied in primary product exports (defined here as all mining, raw timber, raw chemicals, and basic metals) have decreased from around 20-24% in the early years of the analysis (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) country which China imports from must be modeled (see (Peters & Hertwich, 2008) ). Table 4 shows such results, in million tonnes of CO 2 (Tg CO 2 ), for total Chinese emissions (total), emissions embodied in exports (EEE) and emissions in China avoided by importing (EAI) for all years.
Results
Clearly, China avoids large amounts of emissions through its imports; in every year the avoided emissions are higher than the exported emissions. However, as previously explained EAI is a biased measure for China, since China's carbon intensity is significantly higher than most (Peters & Hertwich, 2008; Peters et al., 2007) . Previous work which has accounted for this difference has estimated that in 2001 carbon emissions embodied in China's imports were four times lower than in its exports (Peters & Hertwich, 2008) .
The current focus on China mirrors the importance of trade in the environmental profile of many other countries. For example, in 2001, 22% of global CO 2 emissions were in the production of exports (Peters & Hertwich, 2008) . Countries vary widely in their relative shares of CO 2 in trade; most European countries have a high share of their domestic emissions in the production of exports (20-50%), the USA had 8%, Japan 15%, India 13%, South Korea 28%, and South Africa 45% (Peters & Hertwich, 2008) . A key explanatory variable for the share of emissions in the production of exports is size -in general, small countries have larger shares while large, and thus relatively selfsufficient, countries have lower shares. China does not fall into this categorization as it is a large country with a large share of exports. China's exports thus play an important role in its environmental profile compared to other countries.
A key question is whether the rapid growth of exports in China -or any other countryis at the expense of production in developed countries, loosely termed by many as "carbon leakage" (Metz et al., 2007) or the "pollution haven hypothesis (PHH)" (Rothman, 1998) . The IPCC has placed low importance on carbon leakage since its definition of leakage only considers marginal emission changes in non-Annex I countries resulting explicitly from climate policy within Annex I countries. It is unlikely that China's increased export emissions are due to current climate policy in Annex I countries; they are simply a byproduct of China's other advantages for production such as lower environmental standards and lower labor costs. Using the IPCC definition one would expect to find low levels of carbon leakage, and thus, the problem has been defined away. But the issue does remain: increased consumption in Annex I countries is met by expanded production in non-Annex I countries (Peters & Hertwich, 2008; Rothman, 1998; Weber et al., 2007) . A stronger definition of carbon leakage considers increases in emissions in non-Annex I countries that might occur for reasons other than climate policy in Annex I countries. It is this latter type of "carbon leakage" that lies at the core of China's increased export emissions.
Indeed, large portions of recent Chinese export emissions go to the developed world, with approximately 27% to the US, 19% to the EU-27, and 14% to the remaining Annex B countries, mainly Japan, Australia, and New Zealand (Figure 3) . While approximately 40% of China's export emissions go to the non-Annex B developing world, these flows are still important because Chinese exports to developing countries may displace either domestic production there or production from another trading partner which would have released less CO 2 for the same amount of products. This is because relative to production in most other countries, Chinese production is more polluting, due both to inefficient production systems and a coal-dominated electricity supply (Peters & Hertwich, 2008; Weber & Matthews, 2007) . The low-cost of Chinese production does benefit most consumers, but this benefit comes at the detriment of both the local Chinese environment (Streets et al., 2006) and the global environment due to the effects of climate change. Cheap production in China could be globally beneficial in terns of the environment as well, though, particularly in driving down the costs of environmental products like energy-efficient lighting or wind turbines. Any increased emissions from production of these products in China would likely be outweighed by the positive impacts of their use. Unfortunately, this potential benefit of cheap Chinese production has not yet materialized.
Recently, China reacted to both the increasing pollution caused by the production of exports and fears of resource security by raising export taxes on certain products IIOMME08 Seville -July, 9-11 2008 fig. 2 ).
A more effective approach would use monetary or tax policy to discourage largevolume export commodities such as machinery (19% of exported CO 2 in 2005), electronics (22%), metal products (13%), and textiles (11%). However, since these higher value-added products contribute more to China's economic growth than primary products, this approach would lead to higher costs to the Chinese economy through loss in competitiveness, as well as costs to consuming countries through increasing inflation.
Discussion: Who is Responsible for China's Emissions?
It is clear Chinese exports are currently responsible for large amounts of greenhouse gas emissions; our estimate for 2005 (1700 Mt CO 2 ) represents 6% of global CO 2 emissions from fossil fuels (EIA, 2007) . This staggering statistic begs the question of who should be responsible for the emissions resulting from the production of China's exports (Munksgaard et al., 2001 ). There are, of course, many arguments from both sides of the issue.
On the one hand, while China's economic development benefits from export growth, so do the consumers in developed countries, and it can be argued that they should be held at least somewhat responsible for emissions occurring because of their demand for lowpriced goods. If these consumers were to become partially responsible for China's export emissions (Peters, 2008) , perhaps China would be more willing to play an active role in post-Kyoto climate commitments. In general, recognizing the role the international trade plays in greenhouse gas emissions may open new opportunities, and are possibly a precondition, for political agreement (Peters & Hertwich, 2008) .
However, there are also many arguments against countries taking responsible for emissions from Chinese imports. China itself imports many products, including many components of the final products it exports, and it avoids greenhouse gas emissions by
The Contribution of Chinese Exports to Climate Change 13 IIOMME08 Seville -July, 9-11 2008 doing so. As shown above, in all years analyzed, the emissions in China avoided by importing were actually higher than exported emissions, though in reality, since most countries are less carbon-intensive than China, the actual emissions embodied in China's imports are lower than the emissions avoided in China.
Further, although one-third of China's CO 2 emissions result from the production of exports, it is important to keep track of the remaining two-thirds of emissions. Capital expenditure necessary for building up infrastructure and production capacities has been responsible for between 32-37% of China's CO 2 emissions since 1987(see above Fig.   1 ). Of course, at least part of these emissions could be indirectly attributed to exports because much of the infrastructure improvements occurring are for export production. Whoever is responsible for emissions to produce Chinese exports, inefficient and coaldominated electricity production is at the core of China's CO 2 emissions, accounting for 44% of China's total emissions in 2005. It is clear that urgent improvements are needed in this sector. Increasing efficiencies, installing more renewable power, and overcoming the financial and technological hurdles involved with carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) should be the first priority of China and its export partners alike. Allowing Kyoto parties to count the incremental cost of CCS within the framework of the Clean Development Mechanism could be a crucial first step (de Coninck, 2008) . However, the monumental size of the challenge ensures that all available options will be needed. Seville -July, 9-11 2008
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